DOES HOUSEWORK RULE?

Fertility Intentions of Women in Turkey from a Gender Equity Perspective

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Abstract

Fertility levels worldwide have witnessed a dramatic decline, especially since the 1970s, and despite many diverse studies, the reasons behind this shift have remained elusive. Many researchers have attributed the low levels of fertility to the changing status of women, although they typically focus on women's status in the public sphere, which represents only half of the picture. Gender equity theory can overcome this shortfall by focusing on the different social institutions that exist in both the public and private sectors. This study provides an empirical test of gender equity theory for fertility intentions of women in Turkey by focusing on three particular dimensions of gender equity; those being the allocation of housework, education level and employment status. To this end, micro-level analyses are carried out for women of different age groups using nationally representative data from the Turkey Demographic and Health Survey, 2008. The results show that, after controlling for education level and current working status, the allocation of housework has a significant effect on the fertility intentions of women in the 25–34 age group. As the first study relating the status of women in not only the public realm, but also the private realm, to their fertility intentions, this study provides some important contributions to the existing body of literature on the relationship between fertility and gender equity in Turkey.

Keywords: fertility intentions, gender equity, allocation of housework, Turkey

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> "Assume, for example, that gender equity requires not only equal respect for women and men, but also some more substantive kind of equality, such as equality of resources or equality of capabilities. Assume, in addition, that it requires not only parity of participation in socially valued activities, but also the decentering of androcentric measures of social value. In that case, each of four distinct norms must be respected for gender equity to be achieved. Failure to satisfy any one of them means failure to realize the full meaning of gender equity." (Fraser, 1994, p. 595)

1. Introduction

Ehrlich, in his 1968 best-selling book *Population Bomb*, alerted policy makers and scholars to the possibility of a global crisis resulting from over-population and high fertility. He asserted that world population numbers were going to increase dramatically, and this would result in famine and large-scale resource deprivations. Happily, the predictions of Neo-Malthusian demographers like Ehrlich did not materialize, at least for many nations. That said, there are a number of other significant problems being faced today by countries around the world, including global warming and the HIV epidemic, but the central problem that is becoming a significant source of concern for many countries, especially in the developed parts of the world, is the issue of low fertility. This historically unique problem has triggered a wave of new discussions on population: In 2000, Chesnais (p. 2) suggested that, "The well-known mechanism of population explosion (multiplication) gives place to a *population implosion* (division, or exponential decrease)".

Like many other nations, concerns related to low fertility also arose in Turkey, although when measured against the declining global fertility trend, particularly since the 1970s, the total fertility rate[1] (TFR) in Turkey has never fallen below replacement level.[2] Nevertheless, in 2008, the prime minister at the time came out in support of higher population growth for the country and declared that every family should have at least three children to ensure that the Turkish population remains young. Since low fertility was never publicized as a population problem after the pronatalist policies were applied in the first decades of the Republic, this new perspective was a surprise for the members of a society in which having two children has, for some time, been perceived as the norm.

Low fertility and its possible consequences gained attention not only in political circles, but also in academia. Several approaches have attempted to explain low fertility, with different factors ranging from material conditions (such as the diffusion of contraceptive methods controlled by women, and changes in economic circumstance) to ideological conditions (such as empowerment of women and a

[1] TFR refers to the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime if she experiences the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime and she survives until the end of her reproductive life.
[2] Total fertility levels are about 2.1 children per women.

shift in the norms and changes in values related to individualism). Approaches which include these various instigating factors make a valuable contribution to the understanding of low fertility, yet they fail to explain the very low levels experienced in Western countries. Hence, there is the need for a more gendered approach to explain very low levels of fertility, which is where gender equity theory can make its mark.

Gender equity is considered in this study as central to the understanding of the fertility intentions of women, in that gender is a definitive and correlative variable that affects many facets of life. Mathews (1999, p. 23) suggests that a correlation exists between lowered fertility rates and changing gender arrangements in a society. As the gender system evolves, fertility declines in both lesser and more developed countries. Male dominance over women has prevailed throughout most periods in history, so to understand why fertility rates were higher in the past, one must first examine the means by which society channeled the activities of women (Keyfitz, 1986, p. 148). Up until the 1970s, the male breadwinner model predominated in all currently advanced countries (McDonald, 1997, p. 15). Since that time, the gender relationship has been undergoing a process of change all around the world (Lauk & Meyer, 2005, p. 3).

After gaining rights in regards to property and suffrage, women in the West have gone on to gain many other rights related to individual-oriented institutions[3] (McDonald, 2000, p.436). These rights provided a pathway for gender equity in the public sphere; women entered the labor force in great numbers and took advantage of the educational opportunities that were newly opened to them. This was a revolution in gender relations that was presumed to lead in the direction of another revolution in the gendered division of housework. Yet, as Hochschild and Machung (1989) put it, the revolution in the family institution "stalled". Along with the transitions in public life, gender equity within family-related institutions[4] has continued to change, but at a very slow pace (McDonald, 2000, p. 433). In Primeau's (2000, p. 118) words, "Women have moved into the traditionally-male domain of paid work at a faster rate than men have moved into the traditionally-female domain of household work". Similarly, since the establishment of the Republic, women in Turkey have enjoyed civil and political rights, at least on paper, although the gender gaps in many areas of life continue to exist. Just like their counterparts in the West, women in Turkey participate in education and the labor market, yet housework retains a strong cultural association with women, and the "stalled revolution" has resulted in unequal distribution of housework between women and men.

[3] By individual-oriented institutions, McDonald (2000) means institutions that deal with people as individuals, such as the institutions of democracy, education and employment – all of which were previously male-dominated institutions.

[4] By family related institutions, McDonald (2000) means institutions that deal with people as members of families, such as industrial relations, services, government transfers and the family itself.

Considering all the points mentioned above, it is obvious that women face different levels of gender equity in different social institutions. According to McDonald (1997, p. 27), the inconsistency between the levels of gender equity in different social institutions can explain the very low fertility levels in advanced countries. Like their Western counterparts, an inconsistency in the levels of gender equity, as McDonald so eloquently pointed out, has been experienced by some women in Turkey, and may also have affected their fertility intentions, and consequently their fertility behavior -especially when one considers fertility as a *purposive behavior,* based on intentions (Schoen, Astone, Kim, Nathanson & Fields, 1999 p. 799).

The objective of this study is to develop an empirical test of gender equity theory for fertility intentions through an examination of the levels of gender equity for different social institutions in both the public and private realms. The focus is on three particular dimensions of gender equity, employment and education, which are among the individual-oriented institutions, and the allocation of housework among the family-related institutions. These three areas of life can be considered essential not only in the arrangement of gender relationships, but also in understanding the powers that affect the level of gender equity. While taking into account education and employment, this study has a specific interest in the allocation of housework, since the relationship between the division of housework and fertility is a topic that has, to date, remained untouched in Turkey. To subject gender equity theory to an empirical test, micro-level analyses are carried out on nationally representative data garnered during the Turkey Demographic and Health Survey of 2008 (TDHS-2008).

This study firstly discusses the context of Turkey, beginning with a presentation of the current fertility level and population policies since the establishment of the Republic, and continues with a discussion of gender equity in the public lives of women, followed by an analysis of gender equity in the private realm in Turkey. Next, it presents a literature review on low fertility with an emphasis on gender equity theory, and three main theoretical approaches on housework are put forth, after which the relationship between low fertility and allocation of housework is discussed. This part continues with the theoretical framework, with the intention being to explain the researcher's approach to the relationship between fertility and gender equity in Turkey. The data and methodology is set out in the fourth part, beginning with a description of the main source of data, then the key variables used in the analyses and the results of the logistic regression analyses are introduced. Finally, in the results and discussions part, the results of models, as well as a discussion of the findings of the study, are presented.

2. Fertility and Gender Equity in the Context of Turkey

2.1. Fertility

According to the first census carried out in 1927, the population of Turkey was then 13.6 million. After many years of war, it began to grow rapidly and the population had doubled by the 1960s. Although the growth rate began to decrease after the 1960s, population still continued to grow overall,

and by 1990 it doubled again to reach 56 million (Koç, Eryurt, Adali & Seçkiner, 2010). According to data from the most the recent Address Based Population Registration System in 2015, Turkey's population is 78.7 million, of which 8% consists of persons aged 65 and over, while 24% consists of persons aged 15 and under (Turkish Statistical Institute [TURKSTAT], 2016a). According to Ergöçmen (2012, p. 120), the change in growth rates is closely related to the varying population policies over nearly a century, (i.e., 93 years). After the establishment of the Republic, there was a shortage of human power due to losses in the Balkan Wars, the First World War, and the War of Independence and the aim was to increase the population in order to rebuild Turkey's social and economic life, the pronatalist laws were intended to grow population both directly and indirectly, though. For example, the importation, production and sale of contraceptives were forbidden and financial incentives were provided to encourage citizens to have larger families. The decline in fertility was triggered by a change in governmental policy in 1965. This new policy was antinatalist; i.e. supporting limited population growth and in 1983, voluntary surgical contraception and induced abortions up to the tenth week of pregnancy were legalized.

Two laws related to population planning in Turkey were issued in 1965 and 1983. After 25 years, the determinants of population size and structure, especially fertility, attracted the attention of politicians again, in 2008. The prime minister at the time gave speeches to encourage people to have at least three children. In 2012, he went one step further and described abortion as tantamount to murder, referring to population projections by Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) that suggest an aging population by 2050, thus lowering fertility rates have been seen as hazardous for future population by the prime minister and his government. In the 10th Development Plan of Turkey, one of the goals of the "Program on Protection of Family and Dynamic Population Structure" action plan was identified as increasing the TFR above replacement level, which was the first tangible step based on this pronatalist discourse. The program includes financial incentives to encourage families to have more children and to make part-time work opportunities for employed mothers. Finally, in January 2015, the "Draft Law on Amendment of Some Laws and Decree Laws in order to Protect Family and Dynamic Population Structure" was presented to parliament. Because these concrete efforts to boast fertility are quite recent, their effects on TFR have not yet been observed.

Apart from the above changes, Turkish society as a whole was experiencing social and economic transformations which also bring changes in women's status. The rapid social and economic developments that occurred in the country throughout the modernization process have led to changes at the demographic level, as well. These social shifts affected demographic behavior, especially fertility (Ergöçmen, 1997, p. 81). The changes in total fertility rates since the establishment of the Republic indicate a decline in TFR towards replacement level and stabilization near that point. Before the 1950s, thanks to incentives to encourage people to have more children, TFR was increased to 7 births per women. However, in mid-1950s, a rapid decrease in TFR was observed. TFR was around 6 births per

women in 1960s, around 3 in 1980s, and 2.5 in 2000 (Koç et al., 2010).

According to TDHS-2008, the TFR for Turkey is 2.16. Since this rate stands just above replacement level, it indicates that a fertility transition in Turkey is ongoing. Approximately 70% of births occur before age 30, and births to women aged below 20 and over 35 constitute about one-fifth of all births. The highest age-specific fertility rates are detected in the 25-29 age group, whereas the 20-25 age group was historically the cohort with the highest age specific fertility rate. This indicates that childbearing is increasingly postponed to later ages (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies [HIPS], 2009). Most recent TFR estimation is 2.14 for the year of 2015 (TURKSTAT, 2016b).

Demographic surveys showed that almost all women get married before the end of their reproductive period, so it can be concluded that marriage is universal for all social groups in Turkey (Koç et al., 2010, p.26). Median age of marriage has been increasing since the first periods of the Republic and it is 25.3 for the year of 2015 (TURKSTAT, 2016c). Almost all births in Turkey occur inside marriage and the fact that TFR has been between 2.6 and 2.1 since 1990 (HIPS, 2009) indicates that Turkey has had a two-child norm since then.

2.2. Gender Equity in Public Sphere

The Republic of Turkey bridges East and West not only geographically, but also culturally. Since 1923, with the adaptation of Parliamentary Democratic Government System, it has officially been a secular state. The Republican era is defined by its trends of modernization, with a strong emphasis on liberalization and the emancipation of women (Aycan & Eskin, 2005, p. 454). After the foundation of the Republic, two objectives were declared: the building of an independent Turkish state and the subsequent modernization of this state. Sultanate and sharia laws were abolished and in 1926 the Swiss Civil Code was adopted (Yeşilyurt-Gündüz, 2004, p.116). The new laws prevented polygamy, instituted civil marriage, allowed the initiation of divorce by both partners, and guaranteed the equality of women before the law. Free elementary education became mandatory for both boys and girls in 1923, and the right to vote and to run for office in both municipal and national elections was granted to women in 1930 and 1934, respectively (Arat, 1994, p. 57). The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions gave civil and social liberties to both women and men, with no discrimination between genders (Arat, 1996, p. 29). Changes which were made for the sake of the modernization and the Westernization of Turkey facilitated new opportunities for women in education and employment (Yeşilyurt-Gündüz, 2004, p. 117).

Despite the many rights women have acquired, there are still serious obstacles that prevent them from enjoying those rights. It should be underlined that although the door of the home which was previously locked for women now stands open for them, only a limited number of women have walked out that door, even today. According to the Global Gender Gap Report (2015), Turkey is in a better position regarding its gender gap in the areas of educational attainment (0.957) and health and survival (0.980) than some countries, although when it comes to the gender gap in economic participation (0.459)

it maintains a poor position and in the area of political empowerment the situation is even worse (0.103). Hence, granting equal rights could not completely solve women's problems, and patriarchal gender roles remained the same (Yeşilyurt-Gündüz, 2004, p. 117). Even with clear changes towards the empowerment of women in the public sphere, gender inequity has persisted, especially in the private domain.

2.3. Gender Equity in the Private Sphere

Despite the modernization processes, Turkey remained mainly patriarchal on the social level; therefore, the modern and the traditional exist together in Turkey, within a highly heterogeneous social and cultural structure (Ergöçmen, 1997, p. 81). The rights granted to women change their lives outside the home –at least lives of some women- yet those new rights only slightly affect what is happening inside: housework, for example, is still a strong cultural stipulation for women, and it is considered a reflection of being a good wife and mother in Turkey. Studies on housework in Turkey, which are very limited in number, have had one common conclusion: it is still woman who are doing the most repetitive tasks and who are spending enormous amounts of time on housework (Bespinar, 2014; Erkal and Çopur, 2013; Hatun, 2013).

Child care is another issue to be discussed regarding gender equity in private lives. The care of children at pre-school age is not considered a public obligation in Turkey; rather, it is a responsibility borne by relatives, especially women. Public child care services are extremely poor and private child care services are accessible only for a limited socio-economic segment of the society. In addition, there are regional inequalities when it comes to accessing child care services (Bogazici University Social Policy Forum, 2009, p. 2). According to Ecevit (2010), the institutionalization of childcare services in Turkey has fallen behind, and these services are still home-based and family-oriented. There are scarcely any institutionalized childcare services for children in very early years of life (0-3 years). Children aged 4-5 are educated in both private and public kindergartens, and in pre-schools, which have been increasing in number. Nurseries provide care and education for children of employees in public institutions and workplaces subject to labor law are supposed to have nurseries if they employ a certain number of women workers; however they typically do not fulfill this obligation. Considering the inadequate child care system in Turkey, it is apparent that a woman's working life is being interrupted by motherhood. Some women have to face the dilemma of choosing between taking care of their children and working outside the home. In such a country where child care services are costly, many women choose to stop being part of the labor market and opt to stay home (Kakıcı, Emeç & Üçdoğruk, 2007, p. 24). This choice is also culturally influenced, as women are mainly held responsible for child care, so they are socially pressured to sacrifice their work life for the sake of being a mother.

In fact, during the modernization of Turkey, the end goal was never simply the emancipation of women directly; rather it was the modernization of the country *through* the emancipation of women.

This naturally results in certain contradictions for the nation's women: in Özbay's (1999, p. 563) words, "The double standard of modern society that expects women to be a 'lady' outside the home and still something of a servant within it remains."

3. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

3.1. Low Fertility

The theories and approaches which have been proposed to explain the various factors behind falling fertility levels have, to date, focused on; the diffusion of contraceptive methods controlled by women (Keyfitz, 1986; Bumpass, 1973), the changes in the value of children for families and changing economic conditions (Becker, 1960), changes in the nature of households' economic conditions (Lesthaeghe & Wilson, 1986), changes in cohort size (Easterlin, 1973; 1987), the rise of opportunities for women outside home (Becker, 1981), and a shift in the norms and changes in values related to individualism (Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe, 2010). The final approach towards to understanding low fertility focuses on the relationship between fertility and the level of gender equity.

Gender equity theory suggests that low fertility is the unplanned outcome of changing social and economic institutions (McDonald, 2006, p. 486). The "male breadwinner model" refers to a gender relationship that can be characterized as the gender specific division of labor into paid work and unpaid housework, a social model which reached its peak in 1950s. In the gender equity model of the family, which is the opposite of the breadwinner model, gender has no specific relationship to who does which type of work (McDonald, 1997, p. 15-16).

Although, the male breadwinner model was seen as universal institutional form of family in the past, the family institution has continued to transform further, whilst different institutions in society have at the same time been moving away at varying pace from the assumption of the male breadwinner model, in the direction of a gender equity model (McDonald, 1997, p. 16). This division leads to substantial gaps between social and economic institutions with regard to the presumed model of family, and it has influenced the type of family in the direction of gender equity, which results in low fertility rates (McDonald, 1997, p. 17-18). At this point McDonald (2006, p. 489) argues that low fertility is associated with two waves of social change that have been occurring since the 1960s: social liberalism/reflexive modernization and economic deregulation/the new capitalism. The first wave of change in 1960s and 1970s brought a rapid growth of social liberalism when greater levels of gender equity started to be seen in individual-oriented institutions, especially in paid employment sectors. In addition, women's education levels have increased rapidly. The second wave of social change, economic deregulation, occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. The most important characteristics of the second wave are reduced job security, lowered protection for wage levels, and a lack of standards for working hours

and other work-related benefits. These two waves of social change have led a movement toward gender equity that focuses on individual-oriented institutions, yet family-related institutions, especially the family itself, continue to be characterized by gender inequity and fertility, which, at this point, trends very low (McDonald, 2006, p. 492).

If the reasons behind low fertility are to be examined in relation to gender equity, considering the level of gender equity only in public life would not be sufficient. In other words, analyses which only include variables such as women's working status or education would not satisfactorily reveal the whole picture on gender equity. Therefore, gender equity in the family should also be included in these analyses, and the simplest indicator of gender equity in the home may indeed be the allocation of housework.

3.2. Allocation of Housework

Studies analyzing the allocation of housework typically use three theoretical frameworks: the economic perspective, the sociological perspective and the gender perspective. The economic perspective proposes the time availability hypothesis, wherein housework is rationally allocated according to availability of household personnel in relation to the amount of housework needed to be done (Becker, 1981; Hiller, 1984; England & Farkas, 1986; Shelton, 1992). Time spent in the market as a laborer and family composition strongly affect how much time women and men each spend on housework (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer & Robinson, 2000, p.193). Therefore, it is expected that women's participation in paid work would reduce women's share in allocation of housework. When examining women's *second shift* (Hochschild & Machung, 1989), which refers to the considerably large amount of housework and childcare performed by women even if they participate in paid work, the time availability perspective alone fails to explain the greater household workload for women that is prevalent in most parts of the world.

The relative resources perspective, being the sociological approach, proposes that allocation of housework is an expression of power relations between women and men (Blood & Wolf, 1960). Basically, housework is unlikable, so most people do not want to perform it, according to this perspective (Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010, p. 771), and power balances within the home therefore determine the domestic workload. Based on the idea that family decisions on consumption and production are, in the modern world, the result of a bargaining process between partners seeking to maximize their personal interests (Gonzalez, Jurado-Guerrero & Naldini, 2009, p. 2), the decision about who will be doing housework is negotiated within households, and people's relative resources like income and education have a significant effect on their share of housework by providing them with the power to bargain (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre & Matheson, 2003). Women's increasing education and earning opportunities have changed their bargaining power (Gonzales et al., 2009, p. 4); still, women are primarily responsible for housework because they are generally economically dependent on their

husbands and therefore do not have economic agency according to this perspective (Brines, 1994). As it can be inferred then, gender has an indirect effect on the allocation of housework for this perspective (Gonzales et al., 2009, p. 2).

These two approaches have been criticized by some feminists who argue that division of housework is not simply related to time availability or rational choice of individuals (Bianchi et al., 2000, p. 194). Gender perspective suggests that people are socialized into male and female gender roles that would determine their behaviors (Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010, p. 772) and housework is a symbolic performance of gender relations, which explains why there is not a simple exchange between time spent in unpaid and paid labor among women and men (Ferree, 1990; South & Spitze, 1994). Therefore, housework does not have neutral meaning; in fact, its performance by women and men somewhat helps to define and express gender relations within household (Bianchi et al., 2000, p. 194).

Early formulations of gender approach centered gender role ideologies hold that individuals learn their roles through socialization (Coverman, 1985). Throughout this complex process, individuals come to believe in gender-segregated work and in roles which conform to those norms (Gonzales et al., 2009). Other theoreticians went beyond the passive role of individuals and shifted to the new perspective of "doing gender". The central argument of doing gender is that individual behavior is affected by expectations from others, and in everyday activities, individuals "do" and produce gender. The unequal division of labor between women and men is not only created by women and men, but also by social institutions like family, the welfare state and the labor market (Daly & Rake, 2003, p.38 cited in Gonzales et al., 2009). Wives and husbands do their gender roles through the amount of housework they perform, and also through the type of housework they perform. There are significant differences between housework tasks performed traditionally by men and women. Men tend to perform tasks that have a well-defined beginning and end; also, the task should have a leisure component (Meissner, 1977). On the other hand, women tend to perform housework tasks having the opposite qualities (Coleman, 1988).

3.3. The Relationship between Low Fertility and Allocation of Housework

In summarizing the discussion on what has been happening in the post-industrial world to cause fertility to remain persistently at very low levels, two major conclusions can be drawn: firstly, female employment rates have increased since the 1970s (Jaumotte, 2003) and the gender gap in employment rates have moved closer in the developed world (Garcia-Manglano, Nollenberger & Sevilla, 2014). Secondly, male participation in housework and child care has been seen at a much lower rate than female participation in paid work. Importantly, fertility levels to near the replacement level have been regained in countries where men have increasingly become involved in housework (Bianchi et al., 2000; Gimenez-Nadal & Sevilla, 2012).

The role of gender equity and the changes in gender structure are crucial to understanding demographic changes (Goldscheider, Bernhardt & Lappegård, 2015; Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015).

Women's increasing labor market participation has not caused a major decrease in their responsibilities in the home (Goldscheider et al., 2015) and this as a reason some women are postponing marriage and motherhood, or reducing the number of children they have. Countries which try to eliminate very low levels of fertility, then, can solve these problems by a move towards increased gender equity (Goldscheider et al. 2015; Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). Women's participation in the public sphere is related to the first phase of gender *revolution*, and in the second phase, men's share of responsibilities in the private sphere becomes larger (Goldscheider et al., 2015). At the end of this revolution, women and men share both paid work and housework equally. Therefore, an allocation of housework based on gender equity would finalize the gender revolution and eventually it would be expected to facilitate higher levels of fertility – to around replacement level.

3.4. Theoretical Framework

As the focus of the study is fertility intention rather than actual fertility behavior, it is first necessary to highlight how the two factors are related. Studies of fertility intentions make the presupposition that fertility behavior is based on intentions, and there are a number of academic discussions stating that fertility intentions are a significant predictor of actual fertility behavior in the future (Bumpass, 1987; Rindfuss, Morgan & Swicegood, 1988; Thomson, 1997; Schoen, Astone, Kim, Nathanson & Fields, 1999; Berrington, 2004; Westoff, 1990). For instance, a study by Schoen et al. (1999) on data from the National Survey of Families and Households conducted in the United States revealed a strong relationship between fertility intentions and future fertility behavior, while a study carried out in England and Wales investigated whether or not women who stated they would like to have a/another child actually went on to have a child. Another study suggested that half of the women at different ages who declared a desire to have another child did so within the following six years (Berrington, 2004, p. 117). The situation seems to be similar for those who stated that they did not want any/more children. Westoff's (1990) analysis, based on national data garnered during 134 surveys, pointed to a strong association between total fertility rate and the percent of women with no further fertility intentions. His research demonstrates a high level of validity, even for developing countries, and since it has been ratified by many studies that people generally follow their intentions related to fertility, fertility intentions can be regarded as a suitable predictor.

The study presented here focuses on the relationship between gender equity and fertility, which necessitates an analysis based on an inclusive gendered approach, one that includes variables on gender equity from different institutions in society: specifically, employment and education as individual-oriented institutions, and allocation of housework in family as a family-related institution.

The employment factor was selected not only because it allows one to form and maintain a household and live independently, but it was also selected due to the level of economic independence it can provide (Neyer, Lappegard &Vignoli, 2013, p. 252). At this point it is necessary to differentiate

between informal and formal employment. The key characteristic of the informal sector, which constitutes a considerable part of economic life in Turkey, is its noncompliance with legal and administrative regulations (Tansel, 2000, p. 1). Employment in the informal sector is associated with lower wages, and a lack of social security and health benefits, and so it may not bring enough income to ensure women's independent protection; hence, employment in the formal and informal sectors are treated differently in this study.

The education level factor was selected due to its common use as a proxy in the measurement of the bargaining power of women (Doss, 2011, p. 2). Generally, the higher the level of education, the more options are open to women outside the home. Through education, women acquire skills that give them the possibility to earn more in the labor market, thus bringing the potential for a more equal division of labor through negotiation. Education also gives women the power to perform skill-intensive chores such as preparing household budgets, or running errands to public offices.

The allocation of housework is a significant indicator of gender equity (Neyer et al., 2013, p. 253), and in this study, the focus is on actual share of housework. It is logical to make a distinction between the traditional male and female housework tasks, something that has been covered in many studies (for example, core tasks and outdoor chores in Bianchi et al*.,* 2000; as routine and occasional housework in Jibu & Scholar, 2007; and as routine and residual housework in Hatun, 2013). For this study, two types of housework are defined: routine housework including tasks traditionally seen as female work; and occasional housework comprising tasks conventionally seen as male work.

Fertility intentions are strongly associated with women's current marital status in Turkey, and respondents who are not currently married are excluded from the analyses for two reasons: Firstly, this study deals with division of housework, so presence of a male partner in home is significant. Secondly, from a demographic perspective, marriage is very important in Turkey as almost all births happen within marriage (HIPS, 2009). In addition, age is restricted to 15-44 years old, due to the fact that women older than 45 are unlikely to have further fertility intentions, and women older than 45 have a higher risk of having gone through menopause[5]. A considerably higher proportion of infecund women[6] in the in data belong to the 45-49 age group, because of a wider prevalence of menopause. Furthermore, all women, regardless of their age group, who declared themselves as infecund are excluded from the analyses.

This study puts forth two hypotheses[7]: firstly, after "controlling for education level and labor market participation, a larger share of housework (more than 75%) would lower the fertility intentions of women in Turkey". Considering the fact that couples with different life goals agree on varying arrangements in the division of labor, three areas pertaining to the life decisions of couples are included

[5] Menopause marks the end of a women's reproductive life cycle.
[6] 32.7 % of women aged 45-49 are infecund.
[7] Similar hypotheses were put forward in the comperative study of Mills et al. (2008) on Netherlans and Italy.

in the first hypothesis. The second hypothesis is "not only a larger share of housework (more than 75%), but also a higher number of living children (more than 1) would lower the fertility intentions of women in Turkey". This second hypothesis, while controlling for other areas of life, concentrates on the interactions between the share of housework and the number of living children, since the number of living children is expected to affect not only indirectly the amount of housework, but also directly the fertility intentions of women in such a country where the two-child norm prevails.

4. Data and Methods

4.1. Data

The data was obtained from the TDHS-2008, which is the nationally representative survey used in this study. Survey data includes information on demographic, and the socio-economic and health characteristics of a sample population with an emphasis on fertility. It is the ninth of the quinquennial nationwide demographic surveys which have been conducted since 1968. The goal of the survey was to provide estimates for a variety of characteristics for various domains; therefore, the TDHS-2008 has a complex sample design. In the selection of the sample, a weighted, multistage, stratified cluster sampling approach was used. Face-to-face interviews were conducted to obtain data. In order to collect information at the household level, an adult member of every selected household and all ever-married women aged 15-49 in the selected households were interviewed. Some 10,525 households and 7,405 ever married women in reproductive ages (15-49) were interviewed in TDHS-2008 (HIPS, 2009). The Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys are the only national representative surveys which are adequate to produce indicators for both "fertility" and "allocation of housework".

4.2. Variables and Statistical Analysis

In this study on fertility intentions among women, the dependent variable of the analyses refers to whether or not a woman would like to have a/another child sometime in the future. To differentiate women who have clear fertility intentions from those who do not, women who claimed they definitely want more children are referred to as the "want more children" group, while those women who are undecided, those who do not want more children, and those who have been sterilized are denoted as "want no more children". A number of independent variables are used in logistic regression analyses, and Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables.

The variable of "number of living children" is a recoded version of a basic variable that exists in TDHS-2008 data set. It is useful in that it involves pregnancies at the time of interview, considering women would think that the fetus will survive despite the mortality risks, and have fertility intentions accordingly. In accordance with society's 2-child norm can be expected to affect fertility intentions, the "number of living children" variable is a binary categorical variable.

Table 1. Variables in Analyses

Variable Name	Categories	Percent
Fertility intentions	(1) Yes	31.1
(dependent variable)	(2) No	68.3
Number of living children	(1) 0-1 child	30.6
	(2) 2+ children	69.4
Age	(1) 15-24	16.9
	(2) 25-34	44.6
	(3) 35-44	38.5
Region	(1) West	16.7
	(2) South	12.0
	(3) Central	22.4
	(4) North	6.4
	(5) East	42.5
Educational categories	(1) Max. primary complete	68.7
	(2) Secondary school	9.3
	(3) High school and higher	22.0
Working status	(1) Not currently working	70.1
	(2) Working with social security	20.1
	(3) Working without social security	9.8
Allocation of housework index	(1) max 75%	59.8
	(2) more than 75%	40.2
Interaction of allocation of housework index and number of living children	(1) <75, 0-1child	19.2
	(2) <75, 2+ children	40.6
	(3) >75, 0-1 child	11.4
	(4) >75, 2+ children	28.8
Number of women in the analyses		*5890*

The three categories of "age" variable represent women of different age groups, while the logistic regression models are separately accounted for." The variable of "region" includes the five regions that were distinguished according to differences in socio-economic development levels and demographic conditions within the country. The western region, including İstanbul which is the largest city of Turkey, is the most populous, the most industrialized and the most socio-economically advanced area, while the eastern region is the most disadvantageous area, representing the least developed part of the country (HIPS 2009). The "education" variable shows highest level of education completed. The variable of "working status" is constructed by taking into consideration the different employment benefits provided in formal or informal sectors, and social security is used as the main parameter in this variable. The "interaction" variable shows the interaction of housework by number of living children.

Table 2. Weight of Housework Tasks

Housework task	*weight*
Cooking	3
Dining table	1
Wiping/sweeping	3
Washing dishes	2
Washing clothes	2
Ironing	2
Shopping	3
Budget	2
Official business	1
Reparations/amendments	1
Total	20

Since TDHS-2008 asks for *main person* responsible for each housework task and does not include information on how much time spent on any particular task, an index is created to put together information on allocation of all housework tasks[8] into one variable. Considering different housework

[8] Such as cooking, setting and cleaning dining table, cleaning work, washing the dishes, doing laundry, ironing, kitchen shopping, preparing household budget, running errands in public offices, doing reparations and amendments in the house.

tasks consume different lengths of time,[9] each housework task's weight is set differently. Since there is no calculated standard length of time for each task, the simple and practical weights shown in Table 2, are used in calculation of the index. For weights, tasks are divided into three categories: the most time consuming tasks weighted by 3, middle time consuming tasks weighted by 2, and the least time consuming tasks weighted by 1.

Each case gets a relevant weight score if the main person responsible for the housework task is the respondent, whilst it gets "0" if any other person in the family, or no one, is responsible for the task. Afterwards, 10 new variables to indicate the scores of each case for every housework task are created by this method, and these variables are summed up into a new score variable whose range varies between 0 and 20, where 0 means respondent is not the main person responsible for any tasks and 20 means she is the main person responsible for all tasks. From these scores, an "allocation of housework index" variable with two categories is created.

Table 3. Distribution of Housework : Routine Housework

Percent distribution of routine housework tasks by main responsible person based on answers of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey

	Respondent	*Husband*	*Other women*	*Other men*	*Paid servant*	*Not applicable*	*Total*
Housework							
Cooking	92.1	0.4	6.9	0.0	0.3	0.2	100
Dining Table	88.1	1.6	9.7	0.2	0.1	0.3	100
Wiping/ sweeping	89.3	0.7	8.9	0.0	0.8	0.2	100
Washing dishes	90.9	0.7	8.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	100
Washing clothes	93.5	0.3	5.8	0.0	0.3	0.1	100
Ironing	86.0	2.4	7.7	0.3	0.6	3.0	100
Number of women							5890

[9] For instance, cooking is a very repetitive task which is performed every day, while paying bills is performed only once a month.

Table 4. Distribution of Housework : Occasional Housework

Percent distribution of occasional housework tasks by main responsible person based on answers of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey

	Respondent	*Husband*	*Other women*	*Other men*	*Paid servant*	*Not applicable*	*Total*
Housework							
Shopping	45.9	44.0	4.8	5.0	0.0	0.3	100
Budget	20.3	69.4	2.3	7.5	0.0	0.6	100
Official business	20.1	66.7	2.3	9.7	0.0	1.2	100
Reparations/ amendments	6.4	74.1	1.2	11.3	6.1	1.2	100
Number of women							5890

Table 3 and Table 4 present percentage distribution of routine and occasional housework tasks among family members. One salient conclusion from these tables is that allocation of housework is highly gendered in both the qualitative and the quantitative sense. It should be noted that approximately 3 of every 10 women in the analyses think that men should not perform routine housework tasks such as cooking and ironing, since it is *women's duty* in the family (TDHS-2008). Considering very low labor market participation of women[10], to divide housework tasks two equal parts[11] may not be fair for most couples, and the 10 points combination generally only includes housework tasks which traditionally belong to women. Therefore, it may not be adequate to represent a division of labor in accordance with gender equity. Women's participation in residual housework may reflect higher gender equity, since it shows that a woman is able to be involved in decision making processes inside the home. As presented in Table 3, almost all women perform most of the routine tasks, and if they perform some of the occasional tasks in addition to these routine ones; it may be interpreted as an increase in the level of gender equity in home for the case of Turkey. For all these reasons, the cutoff point is set as 75% for allocation of housework index.

Since the "outcome" variable is a binary categorical variable in this study, a series of binary logistic regression analyses are employed to test the effects of the selected variables on intention of

[10] Percentage of currently employed women in the analyses in both formal and informal market is around 30.

[11] Women who gets 10 points (out of 20 which is the maximum score) from the index comprises of 2.8% of all women included in the analyses (number of women=5890).

women to have a/another child sometime in the future. Before designing logistic regression models, independent variables are tested for multi-collinearity. Age is a very significant predictor for fertility intentions: pre-analysis showed that fertility intentions of women in Turkey diminish at later ages, as they have already had as many as children they want. Accordingly, younger women have higher fertility intentions as they have not yet reached the number of children they want. Since age has an overshadowing effect in the models (i.e. it represses the impact of other variables which have relatively minor power on fertility intentions), six models presented in this study are employed to distinct sub-groups consisting of women at different ages (15-24, 25-34 and 35-44), separately. Table 5 and 6 below present results of logistic regression analyses.

Table 5. Results of Logistic Regression for: Model 1, 2 and 3

Results of logistic regression analyses on intentions to have another child by selected variables: Model 1, 2 and 3

	Model 1 (15-24)		*Model 2 (25-34)*		*Model 3 (35-44)*	
Variables in the model	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.
Education(reference=high school and higher)						
No Educ./Primary Incompl./ Primary Education	1.134	0.644	**1.386**	0.015	0.887	0.683
Secondary Education	1.151	0.684	1.486	0.282	1.491	0.438
Number of living children(reference 2+)						
0-1	**22.087**	0.000	**19.652**	0.000	**21.590**	0.000
Working Status(reference=working with social security)						
Not currently working	**3.559**	0.021	1.070	0.752	1.764	0.199
Working without social security	**7.057**	0.002	0.820	0.421	1.897	0.166
Allocation of housework(reference= performing more than 75%)						
Performing maximum 75%	**0.623**	0.045	***1.240***	0.107	1.033	0.886
Region(reference=West)						
East	1.368	0.180	**2.078**	0.000	**3.131**	0.001
South	**1.748**	0.086	**1.652**	0.024	**3.235**	0.000
Central	1.067	0.830	1.054	0.784	**1.902**	0.066
North	0.878	0.760	1.056	0.793	1.457	0.253
R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.424		0.401		0.266	

Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression for: Model 4, 5 and 6

Results of logistic regression analyses on intentions to have another child by selected variables: Model 4, 5 and 6

	Model 4 (15-24)		*Model 5 (25-34)*		*Model 6 (35-44)*	
Variables in the model	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.
Education(reference=high school and higher)						
No Education/Primary Incomplete/ Primary Education	1.125	0.666	**1.384**	0.015	0.892	0.698
Secondary Education	1.131	0.722	1.487	0.283	1.507	0.415
Working Status(reference=working with social security)						
Not currently working	**3.530**	0.022	1.066	0.766	1.822	0.175
Working without social security	**7.125**	0.002	0.817	0.413	2.001	0.134
Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children (reference=>75. 2+children)						
<75, 0-1 child	**12.902**	0.000	**24.363**	0.000	**23.380**	0.000
<75, 2+ children	**0.529**	0.043	***1.269***	0.138	0.852	0.511
>75, 0-1 child	**16.697**	0.000	**20.271**	0.000	**17.136**	0.000
Region (reference=West)						
East	1.389	0.164	**2.074**	0.000	**3.126**	0.001
South	**1.746**	0.085	**1.655**	0.024	**3.131**	0.000
Central	1.073	0.817	1.055	0.781	**1.838**	0.076
North	0.884	0.773	1.056	0.792	1.391	0.322
R^2 (Nagelkerke)	0.425		0.401		0.268	

5. Results and Discussion

The logistic regression analyses were aimed at testing two hypotheses, and the results reveal some noteworthy outcomes. Firstly, Hypothesis 1, which considers higher housework share of women as unequal, is rejected for women aged 15–24. Being married at such young ages, these women are by default less educated and lack the necessary skills to carry out certain housework tasks (for instance, preparing the family budget). Women in this group generally do less housework, and fewer occasional tasks in particular, since they are not able to perform, or are prohibited from performing them by their husbands. In pre-analysis, the relationship between education level and fertility intentions suggests that

the fertility intentions of women with higher levels of education tends to be toward "no more children intended". Since the number of highly educated women in this age group is low, it can be concluded that a lower share of housework does not necessarily mean a more equal allocation. The significance value of the allocation of housework among women aged 25–34 is around the level of statistically supporting[12] Hypothesis 1. Focusing on the magnitude and the direction of change in the "likelihood of having more fertility intentions", the results for this group is very suggestive, and so it can be concluded that women aged 25–34 who carry out more household chores have lower their fertility intentions. The results here are especially notable, since the women of this age group fall within the socially and biologically perfect age range for childbirth. In this regard, their reaction to an unequal share of housework is important when controlled for education level and labor market participation, and this finding represents one of the key conclusions of this study. On the other hand, the fertility intentions of women aged 35–44 fail to support the claims of the first hypothesis. Since fertility intentions have a strong relationship with age, it is likely that women falling within this age group, and who are therefore close to the end of their reproductive lives, simply do not want to have another child, and in most cases, have already had as many children as they want.

Secondly, for Hypothesis 2, in which focus is on the interaction between the allocation of housework and the number of living children, it is proposed that the results for women aged 15–24 point to a relationship between this predictor and fertility intentions in exactly opposite direction. In this regard, like Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 is also rejected for the women of this age group. On the other hand, statistical evidence supports the claims of Hypothesis 2 for women in the 25–34 age group who have no children or one child, and the results for women aged 25–34 who have two or more children are in the expected direction and suggestive in this sense. Amongst women aged 35–44, the findings for those with no or one child are in line with the claims of Hypothesis 2, although the results for those who have two or more children point to a reversed relationship. Consequently, the results related to women aged 35–44 fail to prove the claims of Hypothesis 2. The effect of allocation of housework alone on the change in probabilities of fertility intentions shows a smaller magnitude compared to the interaction of housework by number of living children, so it can be concluded that the number of children has a dominant impact on fertility intentions of women in a country where two-child norm exist.

Considering the historical social context of Turkey, it can be said that women have enjoyed civil and political rights since the establishment of the Republic, although the actual status of women in Turkey is still somewhat enigmatic. Despite the many rights acquired by women, at least on paper, there are still serious obstacles to their liberation in the persistent patriarchal structure of the country. A clear majority of women in Turkey lack the opportunity to enjoy their rights (Müftüler-Bac, 1999, p. 303),

[12] α=0.1

and it can be claimed that women in Turkey were emancipated, yet not liberated in the Republican period (Kandiyoti & Kandiyoti, 1987). According to Müftüler-Bac (1999, p. 304), there is a dichotomy between the two types of women in Turkey: the open, Western, emancipated woman, and the closed, traditional, "unliberated" woman. That said, although higher levels of gender equity in individual-oriented institutions are enjoyed only by emancipated women, persistent low levels of gender equity in family-related institutions are prevalent for almost all women in the country. There is still a strong cultural belief that housework is the realm of women, and these inconsistent levels of gender equity in different social institutions, which lead to lower fertility intentions, are experienced by some of Turkey's emancipated women.

The goal of this study is to investigate the fertility intentions of women in Turkey by using an inclusive gender approach that includes gender equity theory, the latter of which is offered for variables related to gender equity in different social institutions of society, for both the public and private realms. It is expected that the inconsistent levels of gender equity in different social institutions which involve women in Turkey will be a factor in lowering the fertility intentions of some. Overall, the results for women in the 25–34 age group provide empirical evidence of gender equity theory. For younger women (aged 15–24), the levels of gender equity are not inconsistent, in that the level of gender equity is low in both their public and private lives; and this situation is the same for older women (aged 35–44). These two groups consist more of women with a lower level of education, and who either do not work, or who work without social security. In other words, these two groups in Turkey tend to comprise the more unliberated women's sector in the country, and so there would appear to be no inconsistency between the levels of gender equity in different social institutions that would affect their desire for (more) children. On the other hand, women in middle age group (aged 25–34) would be expected to be more affected by the inconsistent levels of gender equity applied in different social institutions. This group tends to be made up of the more emancipated women in Turkey who generally do not marry at very early ages, who do not have many children, and who are more likely to have a higher level of education and are employed in the formal sector with the benefits of social security. Therefore, different levels of gender equity are experienced by women at those ages, and the empirical results related to these women fall in line with McDonald's propositions.

This study has its limitations. Firstly, in TDHS-2008, only ever-married women are asked questions regarding division of housework; therefore, comparisons on how much of housework is done by the woman or other members of the family rely on information from the respondent. This may have two negative consequences: respondents may overestimate their share of housework, or if respondent has a traditional gender ideology, she might tend to report according to traditional division of housework rather than actual allocation. Another problem is that in TDHS-2008 questions are investigating the *main* responsible person from various types of housework; hence, data on cases for which some tasks are shared between different members of household is missing. The data used is cross-sectional which

stands out as another limitation; while some variables, like education, are cumulative, others, like fertility intentions, are cross-sectional.

The subject of the relationship between gender equity in different institutions and fertility has remained untouched in Turkey, and so more research and further studies by independent researchers, universities, institutions and organizations are required in this field. The present study, based on cross-sectional data, investigates only the fertility intentions of women in Turkey, and so it would be an interesting approach in the future to test whether or not these intentions come to fruition. In this regard, there is the need for panel surveys, such as the Gender and Generations Surveys, to improve the understanding of the various factors affecting gender relations and demographic behavior. Data from these panel surveys, including information on both women and men so as to gain a complete understanding of gender relations in Turkey, would be much more appropriate for the testing of gender equity theories related to fertility behavior. Another important extension of this study may be the inclusion of childcare and care of the elderly. Changes in allocation of childcare and childcare support services may have a significant effect on the future fertility intentions of women in a country where the system is currently under-developed, and where gender inequity is prevalent in family-oriented institutions. Finally, a number of suggestions can be made to policy makers who see current fertility levels as hazardous for the future of the country. Inconsistent levels of gender equity appear to affect fertility intentions of women aged 25-34 and there are some policy options that are available. Women belonging to this age group have the greatest possibility of having higher education and of having employment in formal sector. Therefore, accessible, qualified and free childcare services must firstly be provided by state. Then, giving women the opportunity to have economic independence after becoming a mother, generous maternity leave packages for both mother and father, and job security once maternity leave is over, should be ensured. Secondly, carrying out most of the household chores appears to affect these women's fertility intentions, the inclusion of husbands in housework may have significant changes, though. Therefore, awareness must be raised on the importance of gender equity, not only in the public sphere, but also in the private realm.

To conclude, despite its limitations, this study provides significant contributions to the body of existing literature. Firstly, it is one of only a few studies into the allocation of housework in Turkey. Secondly, and more importantly, it is the first study that focuses on the status of women in both individual-oriented and family-related institutions, and how it relates to their fertility intentions through an analysis of nationally representative data. The study clarifies that, in Turkey, gender equity affects the fertility intentions of women aged 25–34, which are the most suitable years for childbirth, not only socially, but also biologically.

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Appendix

Table A. Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variable in the Models

Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variable in the Models which are employed to fecund and currently married women, Turkey

Age	*15-24*			*25-34*			*35-44*		
	Fertility Intentions			*Fertility Intentions*			*Fertility Intentions*		
Independent variables	No	Yes	Number of women	No	Yes	Number of women	No	Yes	Number of women
Education									
No educ./Primary Incomplete/ Primary	31.1	68.9	578	70.4	29.6	1692	93.3	6.7	1776
Secondary Education	18.3	81.7	240	63.4	36.6	186	87.8	12.2	123
High school and higher	17.9	82.1	179	53.5	46.5	747	87.9	12.1	371
Working status									
Not currently working	26.6	73.4	847	66.2	33.8	1809	92.1	7.9	1478
Working without social security	18.6	81.4	118	73.9	26.1	471	92.4	7.6	591
Working with social security	30.3	69.7	33	47.5	52.5	345	92.0	8.0	199
Number of living children									
0-1	9.5	90.5	705	26.0	74.0	849	61.0	39.0	249
2+	64.8	35.2	293	83.8	16.2	1775	96.0	4.0	2019
Allocation of housework									
Maximum 75%	26.6	73.4	729	63.5	36.5	1558	92.6	7.4	1237
More than 75%	23.4	76.6	269	67.6	32.4	1067	91.7	8.3	2268
Region									
East	32.2	67.8	214	64.7	35.3	436	91.0	9.0	333
South	20.5	79.5	117	65.9	34.1	311	87.5	12.5	281
Central	25.8	74.2	256	69.5	30.5	587	93.7	6.3	475
North	18.9	81.1	53	67.9	32.1	165	93.0	7.0	157
West	24.6	75.4	358	62.4	37.6	1125	93.0	7.0	1022
Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children									
<75, 0-1child	9.8	90.2	520	24.7	75.3	507	55.2	44.8	105
<75, 2+ children	68.1	31.9	210	82.2	17.8	1051	96.0	4.0	1132
>75, 0-1 child	8.2	91.8	184	28.1	71.9	342	65.7	34.3	143
>75, 2+ children	56.0	44.0	84	86.2	13.8	724	95.9	4.1	887