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Spouses' employment situation and divorce in Germany: A dyadic perspective

(first draft)

Lisa Schmid

Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology
University of Cologne
Greinstraße 2
50939 Cologne, Germany

lisa.schmid@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Short abstract: (288 words)

Although findings are mixed, previous research has shown that men's and women's employment situation can affect the stability of marital unions. One aspect that might be relevant in this context is the rising labor force participation of women and its effect on the power resources in couples. This study contributes to the literature by modelling spouses' employment situation and its effect on the risk of divorce. It focuses on a broad variety of employment indicators (e.g. employment stability, work load and income) that may affect marital stability in a dyadic perspective. I investigate whether precarious job characteristics of couples lead to a higher divorce risk. Microeconomic, exchange and stress theoretical arguments are employed to derive five hypotheses. I estimate event history models with the Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), which contains information on both spouse's employment situation as well as their marital life course. The sample of analysis consists of 5,670 couples married in 1984 or after in Germany. Based on my results, I reject the hypothesis that an unstable employment situation of one or both spouses increases their divorce risk. Couples where one partner works full-time and one partner part-time have significantly lower divorce risks than those where both work full-time. Furthermore, marriages where both partners have an employment contract and one partner works overtime are more unstable than couples where one spouse holds no contract and the other works regular hours. Empirical findings do not underline Oppenheimer's argument that couples with an equal income structure have a lower divorce risk than traditional income couples. Additionally, the couples' income position is not associated with the stability of their marriage. In sum, it is unlikely that a couple's job characteristics are important for an explanation of the divorce risk.

Introduction

Divorce rates in Germany have been increasing for decades. But macro indicators, like the share of dissolved marriages, of single marriage years show that at the beginning of the 2000s this trend seems to have leveled off (BIB 2015). Besides the family, labor market is another important field of peoples' daily life. Germany has a very long tradition as a country following the pathway of a strong male-breadwinner model (Ostner and Lewis 1995), which implies "breadwinning for men and caring/homemaking for women" (Lewis 1992:161). However, over the recent decades, there are increasingly more women in employment in Germany. Due to this growing number of employed women (Brenke 2015), the number of dual-earner couples has risen and the reunified Germany can be described as a "male-breadwinner/female part-time carer" arranged family model (Rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004:120). This employment situation can strain couples, because couples have to reorganize their living situation, e.g. the division of domestic tasks or childcare. Previous research focused mostly on women's employment and the risk of divorce. A number of papers have shown a positive effect on divorce risk resulting from women's employment (South 2001), but as Özcan and Breen (2012:476) pointed out in their literature review on women's labor participation and dissolution risk, the results are still mixed. Only few studies take both spouses' labor market situation into account (Blossfeld, Drobnič, and Rohwer 2001; Cooke 2004; Cooke and Gash 2010; South 2001). And if so, they analyzed the couple´s employment situation rudimentarily (Cooke 2004; Raeymaeckers et al. 2006; South 2001) or focus on spouse's transitions between full-time and part-time work (Blossfeld et al. 2001). To my knowledge, there is only a single study on Belgium couples that also models the dependency on the spouse (Raeymaeckers et al. 2006). The aim of this paper is to investigate the explanatory power of a couple's joint job characteristics on divorce risk in Germany. This paper will contribute to earlier studies in terms of focusing on the couple's employment situation, analyzing conjoint information from husbands and wives stemming from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). In doing so I try to model the dependency on the other spouse, while previous research neglected this by including employment information of husband and wife as separated indicators. In other words, I try to shed light on the dyadic perspective instead of the individual's perspective. Further, in this paper I control for regional differences between Eastern and Western Germany, as the division of Germany until 1990 has led to other working and gender regimes, as well as differences in divorce rates. Finally, I want to answer the question if the precarious job characteristics of couples lead to higher risk of divorce.

In outlining the results of previous research on this topic especially from international studies concerning the dyadic perspective and some German research focusing mainly on the wife's employment situation and their risk of divorce, I note important indicators to measure couples' employment situation. Afterwards, the theoretical framework encompasses microeconomics, exchange and stress theories. From these theories, I derive five hypotheses from which I employ some discrete-time event history models to answer the research question. These hypotheses refer to the dimensions of: employment instability, income and work load. The analyzed sample is limited to couples before retirement and who married 1984 or after in Western Germany and 1990 or after in Eastern Germany. In the last section the results are discussed.

Previous Research and Theoretical Background

Scanning the literature on research regarding employment and divorce, I can fix some frequently used dimensions of employment situation. The most relevant dimensions of employment for a couples' life are employment instability, income and work load. In the following, the previous research on these dimensions of employment situation is reviewed. Recent research has shown a negative effect of *employment instability* on marital stability in terms of unemployment (Franzese and Rapp 2013), unemployment and feelings of job insecurity (Wagner and Weiß 2010), fixed-term contracts compared to permanent contracts (Böhm, Diewald, and Körnert 2010), as well as an unstable income in the last 12 months (Kaplan and Herbst 2015). Moreover, temporary workers report in problem-centered interviews (N=13) negative effects on their relationship due to their atypical working situation (Niehaus 2012).

Income is taken into account differently in previous studies: absolute personal income, income relative to spouse (Özcan and Breen 2012:464), as well as a household's income position relative to other couples. Empirical findings show there is in Germany a decreasing divorce risk with increasing men's income (Böhm et al. 2010). In contrast, in the US divorce risk increases with increasing wives' income (Teachman 2010). Likewise, results from the Netherlands point out a higher divorce risk for couples with a higher female income share in both, marriages and cohabitations (Kalmijn, Loeve, and Manting 2007:170). But for married couples the dissolution risk decreases with higher husbands' income share while in cohabiting couples this income relation increases separation risk (Kalmijn et al. 2007:176). Evidence from Belgium states a lower divorce risk for equal income couples compared to unequal income couples (Raeymaeckers et al. 2006). Couples in which husbands earn more than wives have a lower divorce risk than equal earner couples in Israel (Kaplan and Herbst 2015). This study also shed

light on the marriages' income position and their divorce risk: couples with a higher income position compared to other couples, have a lower divorce risk (Kaplan and Herbst 2015). This decrease in divorce risk with higher households' financial resources is also evident in the Netherlands (Kalmijn et al. 2007; Poortman 2005a).

Work load, in terms of the number of working hours, seems to be negatively related to marital stability (Böhm et al. 2010; Teachman 2010). In the Netherlands, this is only true for women, while men working more hours have a lower divorce risk (Poortman 2005a). Also, Cooke (2004) found increasing divorce risk with greater working hours (per week) for German mothers. Women's employment situation as an indicator of dependency on marriage is often considered as a crucial divorce risk factor (Böttcher 2006; Cooke et al. 2013; van Damme and Kalmijn 2014; Wagner, Schmid, and Weiss 2015). In the US, there is evidence for a significantly positive effect of women´s employment on divorce risk (South 2001). This effect becomes more positive over the historical time and the duration of marriage (South 2001:239). In other words, there is evidence for a cohort (historical time) and age (marriage duration) effect from women's employment on risk of divorce.

Cooke et al. (2013), however, point out, that there is no significant effect of women's employment on divorce risk in Germany. Other findings show a positive effect on divorce risk for full-time employed women compared to part-time employed women in Germany (Böttcher 2006; van Damme and Kalmijn 2014). Cooke and Gash (2010) even found evidence that marriages in West-Germany with part-time employed women are more stable than unions with full-time or not employed wives.

According to the *exchange theory*, marriage stability depends on marriage quality and is defined as being in a long-term relationship (stable) or ending the relationship by separation, divorce or legal annulment (unstable) (Lewis and Spanier 1979). With lower marital quality and higher post-marriage alternatives the marriages risk of dissolution increases. One resource that affects marriage quality is the satisfaction with the life style of a married couple. Part of this satisfaction with the life style is the women's employment. If the spouses are not satisfied with the women´s employment situation, the marital quality decreases (Lewis and Spanier 1979:279). Furthermore, the exchange theory considers rewards from spousal interaction in explaining marital quality. This reward from spousal interaction can be measured, with the amount of spousal interaction, amongst other factors. In dual-earner couples as long as the domestic tasks need to be organized and done after work, leisure time is reduced and, therefore, the amount of spousal interaction is reduced in these couples.

Stress theories postulate spill-over effects from external stress into the couple that lowers marital stability (Aneshensel 1992; Randall and Bodenmann 2009). A potential source of this stress is the employment situation. An uncertain employment situation leads to stress. If both spouses are employed, a couple's potential strain from the working environment and therefore sources of stress are higher compared to traditional couples. Additionally, the time spent together is reduced and this can lead to mutual alienation and consequently to divorce (Randall and Bodenmann 2009). In this theoretical model coping plays also a central role. Stress only leads to mutual alienation if the couple is not able to cope with this stress. But, if the couple has enough time and resources for coping, stress is not compulsorily negative.

Pivotal in the *microeconomic theory* are rewards that individuals can produce under costs in a common household. Whether the utility maximizing actors reach their expected gains from marriage depends on the quality of the marital match and the effectiveness of the spouses' division of labor. Investing in a marriage, e.g. in children or a dwelling, increases the gain from the marriage and, therefore, stabilizes the relationship. As Becker et al. (1977) argue, marriages break up if one or both partners expect greater combined wealth when separated than from staying married. Therefore, specialization in marriages plays a central role to maximize couples' utility of their action. These gains from specialization decrease, if women are employed. Employed women are financially able to split up, they engage less in coping with marital problems due to their independent income. This assumption is often called the "independence thesis". In contrast, Oppenheimer (1997) argues in her *specialization and trading model* that couples with equal incomes are more stable, due to the equal loss in wealth for both partners in the case of divorce, as well as their greater wealth compared to traditional husband-earner families or singles. In her point of view, it is a very risky strategy to engage in the traditional male breadwinner model. Because if the breadwinner losses his job due to unemployment or illness, the family loses all its financial grounds. In this theoretical framework families with financial problems have lower marital stability than families without financial problems.

Based on the exchange theory and stress theory, I can assume that a decreasing stability in couple's employment situation increases the risk of divorce (H1). This is assumed due to the spill-over effect of stress. Employees with instable employment situation are under pressure to perform well in the job and, therefore, their work-related stress may spill over to their relationship. But, it could also be derived from Oppenheimer's framework: an unstable employment situation can endanger a family's wealth, if the contract will not be resigned or the unstably employed spouse will not find a new job and the family loses its income.

The second hypothesis states that, following the argument of time spent together, divorce risk increases the higher a couple's working hours are (H2). Additionally, couples working overtime have a lower amount of time to spend together compared to couples working regular hours. Therefore, I suppose a lower marital stability for couples working overtime compared to couples working regular hours (H3).

Following the assumptions of microeconomics, I postulate a higher risk of divorce for couples with traditional income structure compared to couples with equal income structure (H4). Further, I expect that the higher the couple's socioeconomic position, the lower their divorce risk (H5). This assumption is in line with the utility maximizing argument, while partners in wealthier marriages have even worse possibilities to find a partner match with higher expected utility than they gain in their current marriage.

Methods and Data

The empirical analyses are based on the SOEP (v30), which has been conducted since 1984 in Western Germany and since 1990 in Eastern Germany (Schupp et al. 2015; Wagner et al. 2008). This panel includes, besides the respondent's employment history, information on the biographical background of the respondent's family life. Since the SOEP is designed as a household panel, this data is available on a dyadic level as long as a couple lives together in one household. In this study, I take couples into account that are in their first marriage and only those couples married in West-Germany since 1984 or later and in East- Germany since 1990 or later. I focus on couples with none of the spouses yet retired. Therefore, the underlying sample of analysis consists of 5,670 couples (33,106 couple-years). Independent variables are operationalized as couple's typologies, e.g. what kind of contract the spouses hold (for an overview, see Table A1, Appendix). These predictors are all time dependent. So, the main predictors of our analysis are five indicators which are operationalized in dependence on both spouses. In Table 1, the descriptive statistics in the first year of the couples' marriages are printed (for descriptive statistics in couple-years, see Table A2, Appendix).

Employment stability is measured with the indicator *type of contract* in regards to holding a fixed-term, a permanent or no contract. Holding no contract also includes people who are self-employed, are in maternity leave or in vocational training. Operationalizing the variable type of contract, I get six categories: both holding permanent contracts (1), one spouse holding a permanent and the other no contract (2), one spouse is holding a permanent contract and the other a fixed-term contract (3), the 4th category includes couples both holding fixed-term contracts (4), the 5th category includes couples with one spouse holding a fixed-term and the

other holding no contract (5). The last category includes couples in which both spouses do not hold a contract (6).

Operationalizing *income* for this analysis, two indicators are used: the first indicator is *net income relative to spouse*. This indicator has three categories. If the husband earns more than 60 percent of the household income, the marriage is rather traditional and in the first group (1). Couples with about equal income structure where the husband earns 40 to 60% of the household net income, the marriage is in the second group (2). Non-traditional couples where the wife's income is more than 60% of the household income, are summed up in the "husband less" income group (3). The second income indicator is the *household's income position*. Household's income position indicates in which income tertile (lower (1), middle (2), upper (3)) the marriage can be located in year *t* compared to the other marriages in this year *t.*

To measure the dimension of *working hours*, I use, on the one hand, the couple's *temporal work load*. This variable is operationalized categorically with characteristics of: both spouses full-time (1), one spouse is working full-time and the other maximum part-time (2), and the third category is both spouses working maximum part-time. Working maximum part-time includes people working regularly part-time, who are in vocational training, are marginally or irregularly part-time employed, are not employed as well as people working in sheltered workshops. On the other hand, I measure work load with a variable that indicates if the spouses are working *overtime.* For this analysis working overtime is defined as working at least five hours per week more than fixed in the working contract. The self-reported information of the respondent concerning overtime work is used. If both spouses do not hold a contract, e.g. due to being self-employed, or non-working, the indicator overtime is 1. The second character of this indicator is true if one spouse is working regularly and the other is holding no contract. And in the third category there are couples with one spouse holding no contract and the other is working overtime. Furthermore, there are groups for couples both working regular hours (4), one spouse working regularly and the other working overtime (5) and, lastly, both working overtime (6).

Control variables:

Children: As children are, theoretically speaking, an investment into the marriage, I include the presence of children in a marriage. Therefore, I generate a metric variable that changes in year of birth and counts them. I used the information of the biobirth-data and only included them in the analysis if the year of birth is valid (don´t know and implausible values were deleted).

Property: To control for dwelling property I use the information from the generated household data set (hgen). I do not know if the dwelling is his or hers, but in our analyses this doesn´t

matter. In the end, I have a dichotomous variable, if the couple lives in own dwelling (1) or in a rented dwelling (0), which includes people indicating to be a main tenant, subtenant, tenant as well as resident of a home or institutional living facility.

Region: In the analysis I include a variable that indicates if the household is settled in Western (0) or Eastern Germany (1).

The sample of analysis includes 5,670 marriages from which 8 % got divorced while they were observed. The mean duration of these marriages is around 7 years.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics in the first year of marriage

Variable	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Divorce	5,670	0.08	0.27	0	1
Marriage duration	5,670	7.39	6.94	1	29
Type of contract	5,670	2.11	1.42	1	6
Work load	5,670	1.82	0.53	1	3
Overtime	5,670	3.13	1.21	1	6
Rel. Income to spouse	5,670	1.34	0.62	1	3
Income Position	5,670	1.98	0.83	1	3
Region	5,670	0.14	0.35	0	1
Children	5,670	1.32	1.10	0	9
Owner	5,670	0.47	0.50	0	1

Source: SOEP, own calculations

After describing the sample, I first estimate survival probabilities of couple's labor market characteristics. In a second step, discrete-time event history models are employed (Allison 2014; Singer and Willett 2003). To model a sickle function, we include marriage duration and its logarithm into the multiple estimations, as recommended by Klein (2003). All in all, six event history models are estimated. I employ the discrete-time event history model on the marriage duration, its logarithm, the year of marriage and a predictor of job characteristics. The sixth model is a full model with all predictors as well as the control variables.

Results

In focusing on the first year of marriage, the most common combination of types of contract are couples with both permanent contracts (42.03 %). As Table 2 shows, the 38 % of the couples hold a permanent and no contract, which seems to represent the traditional couple. Couples with both spouses holding no contract as well as couples with one spouse holding a permanent and one spouse holding a fixed-term contract are represented around 7% under the married couples.

In 75 % of the married couples the husband earns more than his wife, while 16 % of the spouses earn about equal incomes.

The most common work load in the first year of the couples' marriages is the traditional one in which one spouse is working full-time and the other is working maximum part-time. In around 18 % of the couples at least one partner is working overtime in their first year of marriage. Only 20 percent of the couples are childless and every second couple own a dwelling.

Table 2: Distribution of variables in the couple-year file

Variable		Percent	N (33,106)
Type of contract	Both permanent	42.03	13,916
	Permanent - no contract	38.29	12,677
	Permanent - fixed term	7.85	2,599
	Both fixed term	0.96	317
	Fixed-term - no contract	3.82	1,264
	Both no contract	7.05	2,333
Rel. income to spouse	Husband more (>60%)	76.33	25,269
	About equal (60-40%)	16.32	5,403
	Husband less (<40%)	7.35	2,434
Income position (tertile)	Lower	33.67	11,146
	Middle	33.29	11,021
	Upper	33.04	10,939
Work load	Both full time	22.04	7,298
	Full time -max. part time	72.41	23,971
	Both max. part-time	5.55	1,837
Overtime	Both no contract	7.08	2,344
	No contract - regular	37.06	12,269
	No contract - overtime	7.43	2,461
	Both regular	37.69	12,476
	Overtime - regular	10.00	3,309
	Both overtime	0.75	247
Region	West Germany	87.27	28,890
	East Germany	12.73	4,216
Children	No children	19.79	6,553
	Min. 1 child	80.21	72,572
Owner	No	49.18	16,282
	Yes	50.82	16,824

Source: SOEP, own calculations

Comparing marriage survival probabilities according to type of contract reveals that couples with both fixed-term contracts show the highest probability to divorce (see Figure 1, upper left panel). Couples with about equal income structure have the highest probability to divorce. If the husband earns more or less than his spouse, couples show a lower probability to divorce (see Figure 1, upper right panel). This finding underlines that economic dependence on the spouse decreases the likelihood of a divorce. The middle left panel in Figure 1 points out that couples with a lower income position do have a higher probability to divorce than couples with a higher income position.

Figure 1: Estimated survival probabilities



Source: SOEP, own calculations

Furthermore, the survival analysis show that couples with a traditional work load (full-time, max. part-time) are the most stable couples in this data. Working overtime seems not to influence the probability to divorce as long as those couples with at least one partner who does not hold a contract do have the highest probability to divorce (see Figure 1, lower left panel).

The results of discrete-time event history models on the transition to divorce in West-Germany are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. The models in Table 3 estimates the average marginal effects on the transition to divorce predicted with each labor market character separately. In these models the marriage duration, its logarithm, as well as the year of marriage are included. Table 4, however, presents the full model including all predictor variables as well as the control variables.

The results of model 1 and model 3 show no significant effect of the couples' types of contract and their income position on the transition to divorce. These results are against our assumptions. Couples with about equal income do have a 0.5 % higher likelihood to divorce than couples with a traditional income structure. This effect is significant and is not in line with the hypothesis that postulates a lower divorce risk for couples with equal income structure.

Concerning work load, the estimated models show a significantly lower divorce risk for couples with traditional work-loads. In other words, couples with one partner working full-time and the other working maximum part-time do have a 0.5 % lower risk of divorce compared to couples both working full-time. But marriages with the greatest share of leisure time (both working max. part-time) do not have a significantly different divorce risk than couples where both spouses are working full-time. Surprisingly, model 5 shows a significant reduction of the divorce risk of marriages with one spouse working overtime and the other not holding a contract; compared to those couples with one spouse working regularly and the other not holding a contract. Furthermore, couples working regularly and overtime, do have significantly higher risk of divorce than the reference marriages (no contract -regular).

Table 3: Average marginal effects for the transition to divorce in Germany

		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
		AME	**SE**	**AME**	**SE**	**AME**	**SE**	**AME**	**SE**	**AME**	**SE**
	Marriage duration	-0.001***	0.0002	-0.001***	0.0002	-0.001***	0.0002	-0.001***	0.0002	-0.001***	0.0002
	Log(marriage duration)	0.005**	0.002	0.005**	0.002	0.005**	0.002	0.005**	0.002	0.005**	0.002
	Year of Marriage	-0.0001	<0.0001	-0.0001	<0.0001	-0.0001	<0.0001	-0.0001	<0.0001	-0.0001	<0.0001
Type of contract	Both permanent	*Ref.*									
	Permanent - no contract	-0.002	0.001								
	Permanent - fixed term	-0.002	0.002								
	Both fixed term	0.006	0.007								
	Fixed term - no contract	-0.001	0.003								
	Both no contract	-0.001	0.002								
Rel. income to spouse	Husband more (>60%)			*Ref.*							
	About equal (60-40%)			0.005**	0.002						
	Husband less (<40%)			0.003	0.002						
Income position	Lower					*Ref.*					
	Middle					-0.001	0.001				
	Upper					-0.001	0.001				
Work load	Both full-time							*Ref.*			
	Full-time - max. part-time							-0.005***	0.001		
	Both max. part-time							0.002	0.003		
Overtime	Both no contract									0.002	0.002
	No contract - regular									*Ref.*	
	No contract - overtime									-0.006*	0.003
	Both regular									0.002	0.001
	Overtime - regular									0.004*	0.002
	Both overtime									0.004	0.005
	N	33106		33106		33106		33106		33106	
	BIC	3275.47		3236.38		3247.82		3228.36		3262.77	

*Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Source: SOEP, own calculations*

In the full model (see Table 4) only one effect of our job characteristic predictors remains stable. This is the effect of higher divorce risks for couples working overtime and regularly. Even this effect becomes greater than in the reduced model. Focusing on the control variables, only owning a dwelling has a significant reducing effect in divorce risk.

Table 4: Average Marginal Effects for the Transition to divorce in Germany

		Model 6	
		AME	SE
	Marriage duration	-0.001***	0.0002
	Log(marriage duration)	0.006***	0.002
	Year of Marriage	-0.0001	<0.0001
Type of Contract	Both permanent	*Ref.*	
	Permanent - no contract	0.003	0.002
	Permanent - fixed term	-0.001	0.002
	Both fixed term	0.003	0.005
	Fixed term - no contract	0.001	0.003
	Both no contract	0.001	0.003
Rel. Income to Spouse	Husband more (>60%)	*Ref.*	
	About equal (60-40%)	0.002	0.002
	Husband less (<40%)	0.0001	0.002
Income position (tertile)	Lower	*Ref.*	
	Middle	-0.001	0.001
	Upper	-0.001	0.002
Work load	Both full-time	*Ref.*	
	Full-time - max. part-time	-0.002	0.002
	Both max. part-time	0.004	0.004
Overtime	Both no contract	0.001	0.003
	No contract - regular	*Ref.*	
	No contract - overtime	-0.006	0.003
	Both regular	0.003	0.002
	Overtime - regular	0.005*	0.002
	Both overtime	0.005	0.005
Region	West	*Ref.*	
	East	0.001	0.001
Number of children		-0.001	0.001
Owner	no	*Ref.*	
	yes	-0.003**	0.001
	N	33106	
	BIC	3377.18	

*Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Source: SOEP, own calculations*

Discussion

In this study I want to investigate if the job characteristics of a couple do have an impact on the stability of their marriage. To answer this question, I outlined the previous research on three dimensions of job characteristics: the employment stability, income, and work load. The research question was framed into the theoretical models of exchange theory, stress theory, as well as the microeconomic theory and Oppenheimer's revision. From these theories I derived five hypotheses which I tested with a discrete-time event history analysis that is employed on marriages not older than 1984 from the SOEP. These analyses shed some light on the effects of: employment stability, couples' income and income position, working hours as well as working overtime on divorce risk. In modelling the dependence on the spouses' employment situation, I can contribute further research that mostly focuses on employment situation not using conjoint information of married couples. Following my analyses, I reject the assumption that decreasing stability in couples' employment situation increases their divorce risk. I cannot detect a significant effect of the type of contract on divorce risk. But for the second hypotheses that presumes a higher divorce risk for couples with higher working hours my results do show some evidence. Furthermore, I can detect an effect of overtime work on divorce risk. This is partly in line with my third hypotheses. Oppenheimer's argument, that couples with equal income structure do have a lower divorce risk than traditional income couples cannot be supported by my results. In contrast, the reduced model shows contrary effects. However, this effect disappears with including all predictors and the control variables into the model. Additionally, my results reject the last hypothesis that couples with higher income position have lower divorce risk.

All in all, I can only pinpoint an increasing divorce risk associated with overtime work, but, only for those couples where one spouse is working overtime. If both spouses do work overtime, this will not affect the stability of marriages.

To proceed from these preliminary results I want to be gender sensitive in operationalizing the work load typology.

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Appendix

Table A1: Operationalization of predictor variables

Dimension	Indicator	Typology
Employment stability	Type of contract	(1) Both permanent (2) Permanent – no contract (3) Permanent – fixed term (4) Both fixed term (5) Fixed-term – no contract (6) Both no contract
Income	Rel. income to spouse	(1) Husband more (wife 0-40 %) (2) About equal (wife 40-60 %) (3) Husband less (wife >60%)
	Income position	(1) Lower tertile (2) Middle tertile (3) Upper tertile
Working hours	Work load	(1) Both full time (2) Full-time – max. part-time (3) Both max. part-time
	Overtime	(1) Both no contract (2) No contract - regular (3) No contract - Overtime (4) Both regular (5) Overtime – regular (6) Both overtime

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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics in couple-years

Variable	N	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Divorce	33,106	0.07	0.26	0	1
Marriage duration	33,106	10.02	6.68	1	29
Type of contract	33,106	2.07	1.42	1	6
Work load	33,106	1.84	0.50	1	3
Overtime	33,106	3.09	1.22	1	6
Rel. income to spouse	33,106	1.31	0.60	1	3
Income position (tertile)	33,106	1.99	0.82	1	3
Region	33,106	0.13	0.33	0	1
Children	33,106	1.51	1.06	0	9
Owner	33,106	0.51	0.50	0	1

Source: SOEP, own calculations